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Debate: More troops to Afghanistan under Obama
From Debatepedia
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] Should the Obama administration escalate the War in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010?
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Background and context
In 2009, the Obama administration has increased troop levels from around 30,000 to over 60,000. In the late summer of 2009, the administration began considering, based on a request made by Afghanistan General Stanley McCrystal, adding additional troops, possibly increasing the total number to over 100,000 in 2010. Eight years after the War in Afghanistan began, many are asking wehther such a renewed escalation of the war effort is justified, with a heavy national debate ensuing. The main questions being considered are the following. Is the war in Afghanistan "necessary" for US national security? Is it key in preventing future terrorist attacks, similar to the September 11th attacks? Is a continued war effort necessary to achieve these goals and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a "safe haven" once again for Al Qaeda terrorists? Or, are targeted strikes on any budding terrorist cells, continued elevated border security, and heavy airport security and screening sufficient (without an increase in troops)? Does the US and NATO have a moral obligation to Afghanistan, and to helping it develop into a stable democracy? Or, is it justified to consider efforts in Afghanistan only in the context of counter-terrorism, and leave if such interests are secured, or deemed "securable" without troops on the ground? Does Afghanistan have a larger value to the US and NATO, or is its general strategic value relatively limited? Can continued large expenditures of blood and treasure be justified in Afghanistan? Or, in a world of finite resources, should the war be brought to an end sooner than later, whether the endeavor is considered a success or not?
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[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] Success: Is success possible in the War in Afghanistan?
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[  ] Pro
- The US and NATO can succeed in Afghanistan. Peter Bergen. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009: "the growing skepticism about Obama’s chances for success in Afghanistan is largely based on deep misreadings of both the country’s history and the views of its people, which are often compounded by facile comparisons to the United States’s misadventures of past decades in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Afghanistan will not be Obama’s Vietnam, nor will it be his Iraq. Rather, the renewed and better resourced American effort in Afghanistan will, in time, produce a relatively stable and prosperous Central Asian state."
- Counter-insurgency war in Afg. cannot be won on the cheap David Brooks. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. September 24, 2009: "Always there is the illusion of the easy path. Always there is the illusion, which gripped Donald Rumsfeld and now grips many Democrats, that you can fight a counterinsurgency war with a light footprint, with cruise missiles, with special forces operations and unmanned drones. [...] There is simply no historical record to support these illusions. The historical evidence suggests that these middling strategies just create a situation in which you have enough forces to assume responsibility for a conflict, but not enough to prevail."
- Securing Afghan territory and future requires troops on the ground. T.R. Fehrenbach wrote in his classic history of the Korean War: "[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life. but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."[1]
- Success in Afg is critical to protecting US/Western citizens. Sen. John McCain said in late September of 2009 that more U.S. troops are needed in Afghanistan, arguing that the longer it takes to send them, "the more Americans will be put at risk."[2]
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[ ] Con
- More troops in Afg cannot bring success in reasonable time-frame Jeffrey Simpson. "What did NATO expect in Afghanistan, anyway?". The Globe and Mail. September 23, 2009: "Many years, not one or two, would be required to turn around any of [the below] factors [...] If keeping al-Qaeda out is the goal, Gen. McChrystal argues that more troops are needed. Becoming much closer to the people should animate policy. [...] This is easier said than done. One reason that soldiers patrol in convoys and governments place caveats on where and when their forces go is because they don't want troops killed. That's why the Americans used drones to fire missiles at suspected insurgent targets rather than sending ground troops, killing many civilians in the process. [...] As for cutting off the insurgents' supplies of money, how does this get done when the sources are in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and the poppy fields of the south? How do you patrol a Pakistan-Afghanistan border that is almost completely porous? [...] Gen. McChrystal's diagnosis is compelling: a weak state, a corrupt government, Pakistani support for the insurgents, money from the drug trade, extortion and intimidation, no working system of justice, endemic poverty, a police force no one trusts and an Afghan army that must grow to 240,000 from a targeted level of 134,000 by next fall."
- Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Cal), chairwoman of the US Senate Intelligence Committee, said in September of 2009: "The question comes whether there's an alternative to this long-term, comprehensive, full-blown counterinsurgency strategy which he [McChrystal] has laid out. I hope there is because I do not believe the American people want to be in Afghanistan for the next 10 years, effectively nation building."[3]
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [  ] More troops: Are more troops necessary to succeed in Afghanistan?
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[ ] Pro
- More troops are needed, or the US will fail in Afghanistan US General Stanley McChrystal said in a confidential report obtained by the Washington Post in late September of 2009: "Failure to gain the initiative [with more troops] and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term [next 12 months] -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."[4]
- More troops needed in Afg to meet counter-insurgency requirements "Why we need more troops in Afghanistan". Washington Post. August 16, 2009: "U.S. Army doctrine calls for one counterinsurgent for every 50 people. The Afghan insurgency is confined to the Pashtun and some mixed areas of the country -- perhaps 16 million people requiring about 320,000 counterinsurgent troops. U.S., international and Afghan forces will total around 275,000 by the end of this year, or roughly 45,000 below the doctrinal norm. In reality, most of the Afghan police are ineffective at best, and several thousand coalition forces are legally prevented from fighting. The actual gap between the forces we have in Afghanistan and what doctrine recommends is significantly higher."
- Troops needed on ground for intel to fight taliban/terrorists Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009: "The fundamental reason that a counterterrorism-focused strategy fails is that it cannot generate good intelligence. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban know not to use their cellphones and satellite phones today, so our spy satellites are of little use in finding extremists. We need information from unmanned low-altitude aircraft and, even more, from people on the ground who speak the language and know the comings and goings of locals. But our Afghan friends who might be inclined to help us with such information would be intimidated by insurgent and terrorist forces into silence — or killed if they cooperated — because we would lack the ability to protect them under a counterterrorism approach."
- Unmanned drones cannot collect intel without troops, secure country. Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009: "The second reason a counterterrorism-oriented strategy would fail is that, if we tried it, we would likely lose our ability to operate unmanned aircraft where the Taliban and al-Qaeda prefer to hide. Why? If we pulled out, the Afghan government would likely collapse. The secure bases near the mountains of the Afghan-Pakistan border, and thus our ability to operate aircraft from them, would be lost. Our ability to go after Afghan resistance fighters would deteriorate. And the recent momentum we have established in going after Pakistani extremists would be lost."
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[ ] Con
- US/NATO counter-terrorirsm can succeed in Afg without more troops In general, opposition to more troops in Afghanistan does not necessarily correlate to a belief that success is impossible. Rather, opponents of more often argue that success is possible with the current level of troops, along with present adjustments in strategy and funding.
- War in Afg unnecessary; better border/airport security is sufficient. Andrew J. Bacevich. "The War We Can't Win". Commonweal. August 14, 2009: "Those who profess to be in the know insist that the fight in Afghanistan is essential to keeping America safe. The events of September 11, 2001, ostensibly occurred because we ignored Afghanistan. Preventing the recurrence of those events, therefore, requires that we fix the place. [...] Yet this widely accepted line of reasoning overlooks the primary reason why the 9/11 conspiracy succeeded: federal, state, and local agencies responsible for basic security fell down on the job, failing to install even minimally adequate security measures in the nation’s airports. The national-security apparatus wasn’t paying attention—indeed, it ignored or downplayed all sorts of warning signs, not least of all Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States."
- US should make deals, not increase troops in Afg Fareed Zakaria. "The Way Out of Afghanistan." Newsweek. September 12, 2009: "The central problem in Afghanistan is that the Pashtuns, who make up 45 percent of the country and almost 100 percent of the Taliban, do not feel empowered. We need to start talking to them, whether they are nominally Taliban or not. Buying, renting, or bribing Pashtun tribes should become the centerpiece of America's stabilization strategy, as it was Britain's when it ruled Afghanistan... if we make the right deals, it will be ruled by leaders who keep the country inhospitable to Al Qaeda and terrorist groups like it."
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Terrorism: Is the War in Afghanistan necessary to deprive Al Qaeda of a safe haven?
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[ ] Pro
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[ ] Con
- Afghanistan is only one of many possible safe havens for terrorists. Peter Navarro. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now" OC Register. September 25, 2009: "Consider the first argument: Afghanistan must not be allowed to be a staging area for al-Qaida terrorists. Of course, it was from Afghan soil that Osama bin Laden oversaw the 9/11 attacks so this argument seems at first glance compelling. However, Afghanistan is now just one of many possible staging areas for al-Qaida. In fact, hot zone that Afghanistan is, it is now much easier for al-Qaida's decentralized networks to conduct operations in numerous other places, with Algeria, Somalia, and Yemen emerging as the newest strongholds. Why aren't we invading them?"
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Historical lessons: Does history suggest the War in Afghanistan cannot be won?
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[ ] Pro
- Many empires succeeded in Afghanistan, why not the US? Peter Bergen. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009: "Objections to Obama’s ramp-up in Afghanistan begin with the observation that Afghanistan has long been the "graveyard of empires"—as went the disastrous British expedition there in 1842 and the Soviet invasion in 1979, so too the current American occupation is doomed to follow. In fact, any number of empire builders, from Alexander the Great to the Mogul emperor Babur in the sixteenth century to the British in the Second Afghan War three decades after their infamous defeat, have won military victories in Afghanistan. The graveyard of empires metaphor belongs in the graveyard of clichés."
- War in Afghanistan will not become "Obama's Vietnam" Peter Bergen. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009: "what of the [] argument—that as far as the United States is concerned, the war there will be a rerun of Vietnam? Hardly. The similarities between the Taliban and the Vietcong end with their mutual hostility toward the U.S. military. The some 20,000 Taliban fighters are too few to hold even small Afghan towns, let alone mount a Tet-style offensive on Kabul. As a military force, they are armed lightly enough to constitute a tactical problem, not a strategic threat. By contrast, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army at the height of the Vietnam War numbered more than half a million men who were equipped with artillery and tanks, and were well supplied by both the Soviet Union and Mao’s China."
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[ ] Con
- Nations throughout history have failed to succeed in Afg Eugene Robinson. "In Afghanistan, Downsize." Real Clear Politics. September 22, 2009: "As if on cue, the leader of the Taliban, Mohammad Omar, issued a taunting statement reminding Obama that for more than a millennium, would-be conquerors have tried and failed to subdue the mountain fastness known as the 'graveyard of empires' -- Alexander the Great in the 4th century B.C., the British in the 1800s, the Soviets from 1979 to 1989. [...] 'The invaders should study the history of Afghanistan,' Omar said in a message marking the end of Ramadan, reported the Financial Times. 'The more the enemy resorts to increasing forces, the more they will face an unequivocal defeat.' [...] As galling as it is to accept tutelage from one of Osama bin Laden's key enablers, this does seem to be what history teaches. Pouring forces into Afghanistan has always proved counterproductive. The presence of large numbers of foreign troops is the one thing that reliably unites Afghans -- if only for long enough to drive the foreigners out."
- Fear-mongering used in escalating Afg War were used in Vietnam. Peter Navarro. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now" OC Register. September 25, 2009: "During my senior year in high school, in 1966-67, our local congressman came to speak to us soon-to-be-draftees about the necessity of the Vietnam War. His basic pitch was a frothy combination of Red menace, yellow peril, and domino theory. [...] the speech rang as hollow as a beer keg after a frat party. [...] Today, I get the same kind of hollowness in my gut every time I hear President Barack Obama and a gaggle of Democratic and Republican hawks offer eerily similar arguments for the Afghanistan war. Terrorism is the new Red menace. Yellow peril has morphed into radical Islam. Dominoes, perhaps surprisingly, are still dominoes. In fact, sober analysis of the two major arguments in support of the war leads me to the same conclusion as my gut – let's get the hell out."
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Strategic value: Is Afghanistan of strong strategic value to NATO/US?
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[ ] Pro
- Stabilizing Afghanistan and region is important to Western interests. "Obama's War." Economist. October 15th, 2009: "the West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam (see article). Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability."
- US/NATO must show resolve in Afg. to win against extremism. David Brooks. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. September 24, 2009: "Since 1979, we have been involved in a long, complex conflict against Islamic extremism. We’ve fought this ideology in many ways in many places, and we shouldn’t pretend we understand how this conflict will evolve. But we should understand that the conflict is unavoidable and that when extremism pushes, it’s in our long-term interests to push back — and that eventually, if we do so, extremism will wither."
- Without more troops, US will lose its allies in broader war. Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009: "we would likely lose our allies with this approach. A limited mission offers nothing to the Afghans, whose country is essentially abandoned to the Taliban, or to the Pakistanis, who would similarly see this as the first step toward cut and run. The NATO allies would also smell in a "reduced" mission the beginning of withdrawal; some if not most might try to beat us to the exit."
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[ ] Con
- Afghanistan is of little strategic value to US/NATO. Andrew J. Bacevich. "The War We Can't Win". Commonweal. August 14, 2009: "What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny. [...] For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbor—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude."
- Sending more troops will dig a bigger hole for the US in Afg. Tom Andrews, National Director of Win Without War, argued in February of 2009: "The first principle for someone who finds himself in a hole is to stop digging, The US policy 'hole' in Afghanistan is not of the new Administration's making. But it is important for the President to consider if adding new US combat forces in Afghanistan, without a new and comprehensive plan, for US policy there, might be digging an even bigger hole."[6]
- More troops in Afg will anger Muslims, impair efforts in ME More troops in Afghanistan will certainly be received with concern and anger in the Islamic world. This will make it more difficult for Western and Middle Eastern countries to work together toward mutual objectives, such as peace between Israel and Palestine.
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Moral obligation: Does US have a moral obligation to send more troops to Afg?
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[ ] Pro
- US has a moral obligation to stabilize the state of Afghanistan. Peter Bergen. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009: "The United States overthrew the Taliban in the winter of 2001. It has a moral obligation to ensure that when it does leave Afghanistan it does so secure in the knowledge that the country will never again be a launching pad for the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, and that the country is on the way to a measure of stability and prosperity. When that happens, it is not too fanciful to think that Afghanistan’s majestic mountains, verdant valleys, and jasmine-scented gardens may once again draw the tourists that once flocked there."
- "Obama's war. Why the Afghanistan war deserves more resources, commitment and political will." The Economist. October 15, 2009: "withdrawal would amount to a terrible betrayal of the Afghan people, some of whose troubles are the result of Western intervention. [...] Millions of refugees have returned and millions of children have the chance to go to school. But the West has failed to protect civilian lives, to bring the development it promised, to wean the economy off its poppy-addiction and to ensure fair elections—and failed even to agree about what it is trying to do in the country. The Western-dominated United Nations mission has fractured in a public row between its two senior officials. Locally, NATO forces have done fine and heroic work. But too often the best initiatives are dropped when the best commanders end their tours. The Afghan conflict, it is often said, has been not an eight-year war, but eight one-year wars. NATO comes off worse each time. And so to the fourth and most important reason for persisting in Afghanistan: the coalition can do much better."
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[ ] Con
- US/NATO have no more moral obligation to Afg than other states. The idea that the US and NATO have a moral obligation falls flat when considering that this would put the US and NATO in a position of having a moral obligation to many other third world countries that are struggling and in conflict. Yet, such a broader obligation obviously does not exist, so why should it exist in Afghanistan?
- Limited resources constrain moral obligations of US/NATO to Afg. Resources are limited, and limit the ability of the US and NATO to fulfill any "obligation" to Afg. After 8 years of conflict, the US/NATO have run out of resources and political capital for the War in Afghanistan. This is not something to be ashamed of, but is instead simply a fact of life based on the reality of a world of limited resources.
- US/NATO cannot solve Afg, so cannot fulfill any moral obligations. The US/NATO cannot solve Afghanistan's problems, and may actually be doing more harm than good. In so far as a state cannot have a moral obligation to do something impossible, the US and NATO should not have a moral obligation to fulfill the impossible task of stabilizing Afghanistan.
- The US has destroyed Afghanistan enough The US led war has already killed at least 30,000 civilians. That is 10 times more than the amount of people who died in 9-11. And that is not counting starvation as a result of the war, which Aid agencies were predicting in 2001 would take the lives of 7 million people if the US bombed. Nobody knows how many people actually starved to death but Medicine without Frontiers reported a doubling of the child mortality rate between August 2001 and January 2002. As well as this colossal mass murder, the US has empowered the warlords who destroyed Afghanistan in the 1990's. These warlords now form the Northern Alliance and the US has given them huge support, continuing the saga they began in the 1980's when they supported these warlords to fight the Soviets. The war against Afghanistan has caused massive harm to Afghan society. It is also the supreme international crime of aggression and the only moral thing the US could do is withdraw immediately. For more information on this see Michael Albert And Stephen Shalom Interview, Malalai Joya - Johann Hari, The 'Good War' Is A Bad War - John Pilger, The Great War For Civilization - Robert Fisk, 9-11 - Noam Chomsky and Bleeding Afghanistan - Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls.
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Stable country: Can Afghanistan be made into a stable country/democracy?
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[ ] Pro
- Afghanistan is more stable and governable than often assumed Peter Bergen. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009: "corollary to the argument that Afghanistan is unconquerable is the argument that it is ungovernable[...] But the level of violence in Afghanistan is actually far lower than most Americans believe. In 2008 more than 2,000 Afghan civilians died at the hands of the Taliban or coalition forces; this is too many, but it is also less than a quarter of the deaths last year in Iraq, a country that is both more sparsely populated and often assumed to be easier to govern. [...] Not only are Afghan civilians much safer under American occupation than Iraqis, they are also statistically less likely to be killed in the war than anyone living in the United States during the early 1990s, when the U.S. murder rate peaked at more than 24,000 killings a year."
- US need not state-build in Afg, but counter terrorism While the US and NATO could try to focus on state-building and democratic institution-building in Afghanistan, this is too lofty a goal, and unnecessary. The initial post-9/11 goal was to get rid of the Taliban and prevent Afg from continuing as a safe haven for terrorists. This goal remains legitimate, and any larger state-building goals should be seen as non-essential.
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[ ] Con
- Afghanistan is a backward country that cannot be salvaged by US/NATO. Peter Navarro. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now" OC Register. September 25, 2009: "As the British learned in two wars with Afghanistan in the 1800s and the Soviets learned in their bloodbath of the 1980s, Afghanistan is no country at all. Rather, it's a diverse collection of primitive tribes occupying a harsh landscape pockmarked with tens of thousands of hiding places ideal for guerrilla warfare. On the quagmire scale, it rates a full 10 and makes Vietnam look like a cakewalk. Why we want to send American sons and daughters into that trap is the question for this age."
- More troops in Afghanistan perpetuates corrupt Afghan government Thomas Friedman. "From baby-sitting to adoption". New York Times. September 5, 2009: "On Aug. 29, this newspaper carried a front-page headline that should make your blood boil: 'Karzai Using Rift With U.S. to Gain Favor.' The article said that Obama officials were growing disenchanted with the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, whose supporters allegedly stuffed ballot boxes in the recent elections, while Mr. Karzai struck deals with accused drug dealers and warlords, one of whom is his brother, for political gain. The article added, though, that in a feat of political shrewdness, Mr. Karzai 'has surprised some in the Obama administration' by turning their anger with him 'to an advantage, portraying himself at home as the only political candidate willing to stand up to the dictates of the United States.'[...] It would be one thing if the people we were fighting with and for represented everything the Taliban did not: decency, respect for women’s rights and education, respect for the rule of law and democratic values and rejection of drug-dealing. But they do not. Too many in this Kabul government are just a different kind of bad. This has become a war between light black — Karzai & Co. — and dark black — Taliban Inc. And light black is simply not good enough to ask Americans to pay for with blood or treasure."
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Afghan security forces: Are more troops needed to train/foster Afghan security forces?
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[ ] Pro
- More troops are required to foster Afghan security forces. Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009: "Afghan forces simply do not have the capacity to do the protecting themselves at this point and, given the challenges of building up new institutions in Afghanistan after decades of war, will not have the ability until at least 2012. Even that distant date will be postponed further if we do not deploy enough forces to mentor and partner with Afghans as they build up an army and police force largely from scratch. This adds up to a prescription for a drying up of intelligence."
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[ ] Con
- Afghan security forces cannot be trained to defend Afghanistan. Ann Jones. "US wins mind, Afghan hearts are lost". Asia Times. September 22, 2009: "In the heat of this summer, I went out to the training fields near Kabul where Afghan army recruits are put through their paces, and it was quickly evident just what's getting lost in translation. Our trainers, soldiers from the Illinois National Guard, were masterful. Professional and highly skilled, they were dedicated to carrying out their mission - and doing the job well. They were also big, strong, camouflaged, combat-booted, supersized American men, their bodies swollen by flack jackets and lashed with knives, handguns, and god only knows what else. Any American could be proud of their commitment to tough duty. [...] The Afghans were puny by comparison: hundreds of little Davids to the overstuffed American Goliaths training them. Keep in mind: Afghan recruits come from a world of desperate poverty. They are almost uniformly malnourished and underweight. Many are no bigger than I am (1.6 meters and thin) - and some probably not much stronger. Like me, many sag under the weight of a standard-issue flack jacket. [...] American military planners and policymakers already proceed as if, with sufficient training, Afghans can be transformed into scale-model, wind-up American Marines. That is not going to happen. Not now. Not ever. No matter how many of our leaders concur that it must happen - and ever faster."
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Economics: Is sending more troops to Afghanistan economically sound?
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[ ] Pro
- War in Afghanistan is less costly than another 9/11. Ripper McCord. "The case for Afghanistan". TPM Cafe. September 2, 2009: "It's too expensive. Yes, but not nearly as costly as the treasure that evaporated following that same September morning. You won't find an estimate of the cost of war in Afghanistan that comes anywhere close to the toll on our economy following 9/11."
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[ ] Con
- The "military industrial complex" profits from escalation in Afg. Whenever there is a steady escalation of war, in which more troops are sent and more resources expended, the so called "military industrial complex" of military contractors profits greatly. And, certainly, this complex is lobbying for such an escalation for this reason. The public should always be skeptical, therefore, about the motivations surrounding the escalation of war. Yet, even if this "complex" is not driving the thinking and decision-making on sending more troops to Afghanistan, it is important to simply raise the point that the great taxpayer expenditures on the war on making a great number of military contractors very wealthy. This is a moral hazard.
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Opinion: Where do opinions stand in Afghanistan and the US?
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[ ] Pro
- Obama should ignore public opinion, send more troops to Afghanistan. Frederick Kagan. "Why we need more troops in Afghanistan". Washington Post. August 16, 2009: "the administration faces pressure not to send additional forces rapidly or in numbers that could be decisive. It is to be hoped that this administration will avoid the errors of the early Bush years and the tendency toward incrementalism and compromise. Military strategy is not about pleasing the most constituencies but, rather, doing what is necessary to defeat an uncompromising enemy. President Obama declared his commitment to do that in March. Now he must follow through."
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[ ] Con
- Nancy Pelosi said in late September of 2009: "I don't think there's a great deal of support for sending more troops to Afghanistan in the country or in the Congress."[8]
- More troops to Afg is about beating chests to win votes. Peter Navarro. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now." OC Register. September 25, 2009: "The saddest fact is that our new president has taken ownership of this war less for strategic and military purposes and more to show his backbone. As a strong and early opponent of the Iraq war, Barack Obama had to protect his dovish flanks during the 2008 campaign by talking tough on Afghanistan. Now, as he gets deeper into the quagmire, the supreme irony is that he doesn't have the backbone to realize this is an unwinnable war without any compelling strategic rationale."
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[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] Pro/con sources
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[ ] Pro
- "Obama's war. Why the Afghanistan war deserves more resources, commitment and political will." The Economist. October 15, 2009
- David Wood. "War in Afghanistan: The Case for More Boots on the Ground". Politics Daily. September 21, 2009:
- Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009
- Peter Bergen. "Winning the good war. Why Afghanistan is not Obama's Vietnam". Washington Monthly. July/August 2009
- David Brooks. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. September 24, 2009
- Ripper McCord. "The case for Afghanistan". TPM Cafe. September 2, 2009
- Joshua Foust. "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations". Registan. August 27th, 2009
- Jackson Janes. "The Case for Afghanistan". American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. August 12, 2009
- Max Boot. "Obama can't downsize to success in Afghanistan". Los Angeles Times. September 28, 2009
- "McChrystal's Frank Talk on Afghanistan." CBS News, 60 Minutes. September 27, 2009
- "Why we need more troops in Afghanistan". Washington Post. August 16, 2009
- Michael O'Hanlon. "We might still need more troops in Afghanistan." The Washington Examiner. July 7, 2009
- "Bond: "We need troops now" in Afghanistan." Politico. September 27, 2009
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[ ] Con
- Fareed Zakaria. "The Case Against a Surge. More troops won't solve Afghanistan." Newsweek. October 19th, 2009
- Michael Albert And Stephen Shalom Interview
- Malalai Joya - Johann Hari
- The 'Good War' Is A Bad War - John Pilger
- The Great War For Civilization - Robert Fisk
- 9-11 - Noam Chomsky
- Bleeding Afghanistan - Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls.
- Thomas Friedman. "From baby-sitting to adoption". New York Times. September 5, 2009
- Malou Innocent. "No More Troops for Afghanistan". Huffington Post. September 16, 2009
- Andrew J. Bacevich. "The War We Can't Win". Commonweal. August 14, 2009
- Nicholas Kristof. "The Afghanistan Abyss". The New York Times. September 5, 2009
- Peter Navarro. "Orange Grove: Get out of Afghanistan now" OC Register. September 25, 2009
- Emily Schwartz Greco. "The Case for U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan". Foreign Policy in Focus. November 10, 2008
- H.D.S Greenway. "No more troops to Afghanistan." Boston Globe. September 22, 2009
- Malou Innocent. "No More Troops for Afghanistan. Huffington Post. September 16, 2009
- "Murtha to Obama: No more troops" Foreign Policy. September 14, 2009
- "FCNL to Obama: No More Troops to Afghanistan! Invest in Diplomacy & Development." Friends Committee on National Legislation. February 23, 2009
- Bruce Drake. "Public Opposes More Troops for Afghanistan." Politics Daily. September 25, 2009
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